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Get a Signal account for secure communications. DO IT NOW.

signal.org/

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@lauren no, because @signalapp is subject to (= incompatible with & if you ever care!) and collects in the firirm of , which are at best pseudonymous but trivial to track and at most means that people inviting others without their consent comitted an illegal disclosure if PII!

Give + a shot: @monocles / & @gajim / .

1 [docs.monocles.eu] 2 [docs.monocles.eu] 3 [docs.monocles.eu] 4 [monocles.eu] 5 [monocles.chat]

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@kkarhan @lauren @signalapp @monocles @gajim This 👆 is pretty much all false, & bad security/privacy advice.

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@dalias I sincerely disagree because none of my claims got debunked and no evidence against + have come up to me as of today.

I hope to be proven wrong, but up until now I've always been at the position of saying [www.youtube.com] !

@lauren

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@kkarhan @signalapp @monocles @lauren Very few systems promoted as Signal alternatives match the cryptographic privacy properties (see: ratcheting, etc.) of Signal.

The claims about "located in the USA" and "Cloud Act" are all nonsense because the only threat to Signal users from this is availability (seizure and shutdown of the server infrastructure), not undetected breakage of privacy properties.

There are presently no systems with superior privacy properties to Signal *and* level of functionality on par with what general public expects. There are a lot (like the XMPP stuff, *sigh*, and Matrix) that are worse in both regards. If you're happy with reduced functionality, Cwtch (and possibly some other similar Tor-based systems) or VeilidChat are stronger, but it's gonna be a while before you convince normies to use them, and in the mean time they're still going to be on insecure shit like WhatsApp, FB Messenger, Telegram, etc...

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@dalias @lauren @monocles @signalapp @kkarhan > VeilidChat are stronger, but it's gonna be a while before you convince normies to use them

sadge
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@signalapp @monocles @lauren @dalias To be fair though, @kkarhan might well be right about people getting killed if availability is lost at a critical time and it is for some reason or another the unlucky winner's only relevant means of communication prior to that.
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@lispi314 @dalias @lauren

Not only that, but @signalapp being.located in means they gotta have to follow said laws and that means if flexed upon using & or god forbid made-up claims to commit and prosecute minors and/or their parents and/or medical professionals, THIS WILL BLOW UP IN THEIR FACES like a grenade used as ball gag and fuse pulled!

For comparison: @monocles doesn't demand like a or anything at all and if you don't trust them either (which is fair - never trust anyone, neither Signal nor nor me!) you can not only choose from various providers [github.com] but literally your own (even as an on @torproject / ) and thus have full control of all the comms.

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@kkarhan @micahflee @torproject @monocles @signalapp @lauren The PII of phone numbers in this case is somewhat relevant since it allows for side-channel attacks with zero-interaction SMS and other such shenanigans.

Not having the information would mildly complicate gathering data on participating devices to serve as targeting data.
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@lispi314 @lauren Not.only.that, but with a it makes it trivial to get details from @signalapp targeting a known individual.

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@kkarhan @lispi314 @lauren @signalapp You can register any number on Signal even a landline, as long as you can get a 2FA SMS or phone call.

Signal knows nothing about its users, nor does it attempt to. See signal.org/bigbrother/. All they have is the date and time you registered and the last date and time your device connected to a service. They've been subpoenaed many times but haven't been able to provide any data because they don't have it.

Signal MessengerGovernment CommunicationWhen legally forced to provide information to government or law enforcement agencies, we'll disclose the transcripts of that communication here.
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@Avitus @lispi314 @lauren And if you think @signalapp is gonna defy a duely submitted warrant and doesn't store or;collect any like then you propably;also believe that |s are real [web.archive.org]...

Twitterthaddeus e. grugq on Twitter“I’m gonna tell you a secret about “logless VPNs” — they don’t exist. Noone is going to risk jail for your $5/mo https://t.co/Q2aOQJkG4g”
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@Avitus @lispi314 @lauren And that just assumes the - is going to duely submit a warrant to @signalapp and not just blatantly hold everyone.from @Mer__edith downwards at gunpoint.

WE CANNOT ASSUME THE WILL FOLLOW IT'S OWN LAWS ANYMORE!

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@kkarhan @lispi314 @lauren @signalapp KYC demands a lot more than a phone number, and you're conflating "we need your phone number for 2FA” with KYC which collects name, address etc. Take a look at signal.org/bigbrother/.

Signal MessengerGovernment CommunicationWhen legally forced to provide information to government or law enforcement agencies, we'll disclose the transcripts of that communication here.
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@Avitus @lispi314 @lauren

No, it's not a conflation and @signalapp can shove their false justifications in the trashcans, because even they must admit that this is vry much classist at best if notbkakes them useful idiots!

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@kkarhan @signalapp @lauren @Avitus Given the pervasiveness of surveillance capitalism and the ease by which a phone number can be reconstructed into a usably complete profile, collecting even just the phone number is an unnecessary risk.
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@lispi314 @Avitus @lauren exactly that.

Espechally given that @signalapp discontinued , which was -based where one could've claimed a "technical necessity" existed.

  • Nowadays it's rather empowering bad actors and introducing weaknesses given and is inherently and unfixaboy insecure [www.youtube.com] by design and that noone should rely on it being reliable or accurate to begin with as technology to selectively reroute calls and SMS are as old.as the underlying teoephony network!